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DURANGO AND THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
PAUL EISBR-VIAPOllA

IN

1927 Lyford P. Edwards, an early student of revolution
cogently argued that revolutions do not produce social change, but
rather that they are an indication that vast changes have already
occurred within a society. 1 It is sixty-four years since the outbreak
of the Mexican Revolution, one of the £rst social revolutions of the
twentieth century. Since then a vast amount of scholarly work has
focused on the Revolution, but it is only within the last six or
seven years that a new generation of Mexicanists has begun to
examine in minute detail its internal mechanisms. The revolutionary movement was highly eclectic, and lacked a coherent
ideology on the national level, but many historians of the Revolution have treated it as if there were such an ideology. The scrcalled
"custodians of the Revolution" have consistently maintained that
the primary impetus for the Revolution was political oppression by
the regime of Por£rio Diaz. In general, this has been widely accepted until recently when revisionist students of Mexican history
have become increasingly critical of this outlook. New interest in
the Por£riato indicates that "the Diaz dictatorship is properly the
formative era of modem Mexico."2 Nevertheless, our understanding of the dynamics of the "Age of Diaz" is far from satisfying. As
Anthony Byran notes:
the sophistication of mid-twentieth century historical investigation
notwithstanding, many serious gaps exist in our knowledge of the
Dfaz era-yet it -is on this tenuous basis that many have chosen to
erect their arguments about _the origins and progress of the
Revolution.3
.
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In order to remedy this situation, a rewarding approach would
be to examine the origins of the Revolution on the local and state
level. We need to know much more about the workings of the
Diaz political system in this regard. What role did the governor
play in the political system? How effective was he? Was he simply
a "yes man" who carried out Don Porfirio's instructions from
Mexico City or was he permitted some degree of autonomy? What
were his relationships with the local jefes politicos? Were they
appointed or elected, and how much influence did the governor
exercise over them? What roles did the rurales and the regular
army play in local politics?
We also need to know a great deal more about the process of
socioeconomic development at the state level. What effect did the
arrival of the railroads have on local economy? How did foreign
and native capital affect the development of regional economies?
What was the role of the mining sector; what the effect of the
division of the agricultural sector into traditional and commercial,
entrepreneurial haciendas, upon tenure patterns? Were the peasants being driven off their lands, and to what extent were communal Indian ejidos alienated? How do we explain the tremendous growth of the ranchero class, and what accelerated or retarded
the development of this new social group in the various states?
Much further research is required about the development of local
groups in opposition to DIaz' modernization poliCies and their part
in the disintegration of Porfirian Mexico.
The Mexican Revolution, after all, was not a revolution, but
rather a series of mini-revolutions directed at local and regional
grievances. While many of the grievances were national in scope,
they often assumed peculiar local characteristics. Few Mexicanists,
I think, would dispute that the local conditions which sparked the
Zapatista uprising in the south and the Villista rebellion in the
north were similar in some aspects. Nevertheless they can best be
comprehended when one studies their dissimilarities.
Most students of modernization would agree that a successful
revolution is highly dependent upon the disintegration of the
traditional social order-a rotting corpse being much easier to
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destroy than a healthy body.4 In Durango, the traditional social
order, based on an hacendado-controlled cattle grazing economy,
was seriously undermined by the onset of modernization which
resulted from the impingement of exogenous economic forces, primarily North American, on the Durangueno economy. The Diaz
policy of encouraging and abetting the investment of foreign
capital in the Mexican economy accelerated the process.
With the return of stable political conditions that marked the
rise of Porfirio Diaz, U. S. capital began to pour into Durango. By
1880 North American interests had replaced British in controlling
Durango's mining sector. When the railroads reached the Laguna
region of Durango in the 1880'S and 1890's, North American
capital began to be invested in the rapidly expanding commercial
agricultural sector. The entrance of massive amounts of U. S.
capital had serious repercussions for the old order. American
control of the mining industry tied the state's economy to an
increasingly erratic world silver market, and the fall in the price of
silver after 1890 led to widespread unemployment. In commercial
agriculture, the growth of capital-intensive joint-stock-company
haciendas eventually destroyed the old hacendado-client relationship when rapacious, entrepreneurial hacendados began pushing
the peasants off the land, and taking over crucial water rights in
the very dry Laguna region. They deliberately abolished the old
debt-peonage labor system in favor of a more mobile wage-labor
force. This, coupled with the avaricious land policies of the
hacendados, rent the fabric of the old rural social order.
Almost inevitably economic power seeks political power. The
new hacendados proceeded to do just that. In the Laguna region
most municipalities were controlled either directly or indirectly
by the commercial agricultural elite. At the state level the dominance of American capital was aided and protected by the Diaz
governors, who had dose ties to both the mining and commercial
agriculture sectors. This led to increasing unrest among the miners
and the new rural agricultural proletariat, not to mention the
middle-sector groups of Ciudad Durango who saw themselves
bypassed when the economic focus of the state shifted to the
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Laguna. Side effects of these changes were the development of
middle-sector opposition parties in the state capital, the rise of
highly vocal anti-American sentiment, increasing rural violence,
and finally, revolution.
Any study of Durango must include a survey of the land, for
the land question is of paramount importance in comprehending
the course of the Revolution. Situated just south of Chihuahua
and east of Sinaloa, Durango encompasses 123,52° square kilometers, but only 25,000 to 30,000 square kilometers are arable.
The Sierra Madre and the lack of adequate rainfall help account
for the shortage of agriculturally fertile land. The most important
area is the Oriente, or Arid Zone (Laguna), in the east. Prior
to 1 876 these factors, particularly the absence of sufficient rainfall, led to the development of an hacienda-based cattle economy.
Shortage of water was a handicap that could only be surmounted
by an extensive irrigation system necessitating large amounts
of capita1.5
Efforts to alleviate the water shortage in the Laguna began in
the late 1840'S, when three hacendados commenced the damming of the Nazas River. In time this led to the creation of an
extensive irrigation system. With the introduction of cotton an
important plantation economy began to evolve. The development of the Laguna from an arid wasteland to a highly profitable
plantation economy triggered precipitous escalation in land values
and population. At the outset of the Porfiriato, land in the Laguna
could be purchased for one peso per hectare. By 191o first-class
land was commanding 202 pesos per hectare. In fact, land in
the Laguna became so valuable that many hacendados preferred
to rent out their land rather than cultivate it, simply because it
brought a higher retum. 6
During the Porfiriato, Durango's population grew rapidly, but
unlike the majority of Mexican states, whose population increases
were greatest during the initial years of the DIaz regime, Durango's population increased more in the later period. Ciudad
Durango, however, remained stagnant, while the Laguna experienced a tremendous rise in population. Lerdo, for example,
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tripled its population between 1882 and 1910, and nearby
Mapimf increased a hundredfold;7 The principal factor in slowing
population growth dmoing the early period is usually thought to
be the effect of Indian raids, which lasted into the 1880'S. Other
factors were the wars of the Reforma, numerous epidemics, and
lack of an adequate transportation network in northern Mexico. 8
After 1884 the establishment of peace and the development of
a transportation network stimulated Durango's population increase. The building of the Mexican Central and Mexican International Railroads between 1882 and 1892 linked Durango with
the rest of Mexico for the first time. At the same time the growth
of commercial agriculture and the mining industry lured thousands of immigrants to the state. 9 Nevertheless, Durango retained
its rural character and, unlike some states, never developed an
urban complex. Io
The absence of adequate transportation was a major factor in
hindering economic development. Before 1870 Durango was
virtually cut off from Mexico City. Pack mules were the principal method of transportation and more than 60,000 of these
animals were used in the Durango-Chihuahua trade. At the end
of the French intervention, the state slowly began to build the
economic foundation so vital for development. l l
The Mexican Central Railroad laid track through Torre6n in
1882; within ten years the Mexican International followed suit.
Basically, railroad construction followed an economic rationale.
More than any other single factor, the growth of commercial
agriculture in the Laguna determined the course of the railroads.
It was hardly accidental that both railroads converged in Torre6n,
in the heart of the prosperous Laguna, which was rapidly becoming the most dynamic part of the Durangueno economy. The
construction of ancillary lines was designed chieBy to cater to the
needs of the bl!rgeoning mining industry.I2 The railroads served
Durango's major economic interests well. Production increased
dramatically in the mining industry when the mines could ship out
lower grade ores for processing, which prohibitive transportation
costs had earlier prevented. Is The decision of both major railroads
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to lay track through the Laguna brought the region to the economic take-off stage and the final phase in the shift of the state's
economic center from Ciudad Durango to the Laguna.
In spite of the mining boom and accelerated growth of the
commercial cotton plantations in the 1890\ there was little improvement in commerce between 1896 and 191 I. Durango attained its commercial apogee in 1896 when the volume of trade
reached 5.7 million pesos; by 1904 it had declined to 3.5 million
pesos, and remained more or less static for the remainder of the
Porfiriato. 14
There are various reasons for this economic lag. First, the
state continued to rely heavily on the alcabala for revenue. Efforts
to abolish it had been initiated as early as 1866, but the resulting
loss of revenue threw the state's finances into such confusion that
after four years the alcabala was reintroduced. In addition, a number of internal taxes on the importation of foreign goods severely
restricted trade because they brought about an artificial rise in
prices. The mining industry entered into a period of marked decline after 1895 as a result of the downward trend of prices on
the world silver market. Now, with the railroads and most of the
major mines and industries, as well as commercial agriculture,
concentrated in the Laguna, it is highly probable that most of the
goods were shipped in and out of T orrean. If this is true, the
state's commercial decline was artificial rather than actual. 15
Durango's mining industry was concentrated in American
hands. Prior to 1880 the industry had been dominated by British
capital. Soon after the rise of Diaz, U. S. capital had poured into
the state. The pattern of development involved denouncing old
claims and then reworking them with modem technology. By far
the most important mineral was silver, which far outdistanced
other minerals in terms of total value. In 1902, for example, silver
production reached nearly 13 million pesos; while gold, its nearest
competitor, accounted for only 1.7 million pesos. The importance
of the domination of silver cannot be overestimated since it linked
the Durango mines to the erratic world silver market. 16
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In part, Durango's one-sided economic development can be attributed to overreliance on silver production. Between 1870 and
1910, Mexico poured more than $4°,000,000 worth of silver
into the world market. While silver production continued to rise,
demand began to decrease as one European country after another
renounced bimetalism and adopted the gold standard. In addition,
beginning in 1893, when business panic and depression rocked
the United States, Mexican silver reeled under a series of telling
blows. To make the situation even worse, the United States Congress repealed the Sherman Silver Purchase Act and the British
announced that their Indian mints would stop coining silver.
Furthermore, the Mexican peso, which had long been the standard currency in the Far East, began to lose its monopoly when the
Chinese decided to mint their own silver dollar. Finally, during
this same period the price of silver began a steady decline in the
United States, the major purchaser of Mexican silver. 17
The ramifications of the world silver crisis reached Durango
in the first decade of the twentieth century, forcing the shutdown
of a number of mines. Just prior to the Revolution, the Velardeiia
mines in the Laguna suspended operations, throwing over five
thousand miners out of work. In Parrilla, near Nombre de Dios,
the population rose and fell with the boom-and-bust cycle of the
local mines. In Tapia, Inde, and San Luis Ocampo, a number
of mines were closed and unemployment rose steadily. These and
numerous other closures dislocated many mineworkers, who were
now forced to roam the state in search of work. 18
Undoubtedly, the most significant cause determining the course
of the Revolution in Durango was the land problem. The emergence of the commercial agricultural plantation in the Laguna
exacerbated and accelerated the disruption of the traditional social
order which previously had rested upon a cattle-grazing economy.
In Durango, the population increase during the Porfiriato was
directly related to the increase in the number of ranchos. In 1893,
there were 571 ranchos in Durango, but by 1910 there were 2.458.
There was a definite geographical pattern in their development.
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The areas outside the Laguna witnessed the largest increase. A
partial explanation for this pattern is that in the areas which had
the largest number of rural property holders, the land tended to
be of inferior quality, and thus of little interest to the more commercially minded hacendados. Another important consideration
was the relative availability of unoccupied lands, owing to the
decline in population during the Indian raids. Finally, the majority of the large commercial haciendas were concentrated in
the Laguna, which left a sizeable portion of the state open to
the development of medium-sized ranchos. In fact, the districts
which contained the largest number of ranchos were also the districts with the fewest number of haciendas. 19
Without question, the large commercial plantation-hacienda
monopolized the land. Although there were I 55 haciendas in
1810, and a century later the number had declined to 143, the
increasing tendency of the haciendas to consolidate accounts for
this decline. Together, these haciendas controlled over 4,5°0,000
hectares of land in the Laguna alone. The majority were under
50,000 hectares, but the most important were in excess of 100,000
hectares. Furthermore, the average size of the Durango haciendas
was 51,725 hectares, well above the national average of 5,632
hectares. 20
Most of the large haciendas were situated in the Laguna; in
fact, of the ten largest haciendas in the state in 19 I 0, all were
located there. 21 Essentially, there were three types of haciendas
operating in the Laguna: the traditional hacienda, haciendas administered by companies to which the owners had rented the land,
and the joint-stock-company hacienda. Clearly, the most important
of these three was the foreign controlled joint-stock company. In
many respects these operations were quite distinct from their
traditional counterparts. On joint-stock-eompany haciendas labor
was paid a daily cash wage and each worker was provided with
a house and a few animals. Unlike their compadres who labored
on the traditional haciendas, the workers were not given subsistence agricultural plots, but neither were they attached to the soil
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through debt. The nature of the commercial cotton hacienda
demanded a highly mobile labor force, not one tied to the soil.
Nearly all supplies, including staples, were purchased outside the
hacienda. The laborer was paid a cash wage, not company store
script. These corporations felt that cash wages would stimulate
the development of labor specialization, which they considered
more efficient than the old debt peonage system. Thus the old
paternalistic relationship between the hacendado and his peones
was replaced by a capitalistic and impersonal system of wage labor.
The commercial hacienda, unlike its more traditional predecessor,
was not an independent political unit. Nevertheless, the commercial haciendas did wield tremendous political inRuence in the
local municipios, which for the most part, they managed to control outright. In the Laguna, the commercial haciendas created
a new class of owners, with a few mayordomos and a large rootless
rural proletariat. There was virtually no middle sector, and little
interchange between the owners and their workers; 'Moreover,
the increasing demand for labor brought a large number of immi~
grants who were no longer tied to the old system into the state.
This, coupled with the Ructuating water supply and the nonresident wage-labor system which these entrepreneurial hacendados introduced, produced a continous flow of internal and external migration and further hastened the decline of the old order. 22
The introduction of commercial agriculture created a constant
demand for more land and labor. Indeed, more than any other
single factor, the land encroachment and labor policies of the
commercial haciendas were responsible for the mounting tension
within the social structure. Throughout the Pornriato, the haciendas were constantly faced with labor shortages. To solve this problem, tlw hacendados adopted various tactics. Land encroachment
policies were designed not only to secure more land, but more
labor. The loss of village lands forced many landless peasants to
look to the commercial haciendas for employment. To meet their
labor needs the hacendados encouraged immigration. In the
Cuencame district alone, over five thousand immigrants tended

228

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW XLIX:3 1974

the fields of the district's four major haciendas. Finally, a number
of hacendados, particularly in the northern Laguna, resorted to
various sharecropping schemes. 23
The continual expansion of the commercial haciendas at the
expense of the pueblos exacerbated existing social tensions. As
early as 1884 the pueblos of the Laguna marshaled protests against
the indiscriminate application of the 1884 Diaz land law, maintaining that the surveying companies were displacing legitimate
landholders in favor of the hacendados. Perhaps the best example
of this occurred in the district of Cuencame. On the eve of the
Revolution the population of the district was 41,000; yet Cuencame's free pueblos were all but defunct. Over one million hectares of land were in the domain of the district's twelve haciendas.
Much of this land had been acquired illegally with the aid of
sympathetic government officials like Governor Esteban Fernandez, who was instrumental in the expansion of the Hacienda de
Santa Clara. In fact, the situation in Cuencame had deteriorated
to such a degree that Governor Fernandez, fearing peasant uprisings, thought it wise to garrison troops in the district to preserve
order. 24
Along with the struggle for control of the land there was a
battle for control of the precious waters of the Rio Nazas. In
addition to fomenting commercial agriculture, the numerous
dams on the Nazas brought about the establishment of a number
of pueblos along the river. Assured of a plentiful water supply,
these pueblos prospered until construction of a new dam in 1880
threatened to cut off their water. The pueblos made numerous
protests to the Federal government calling for a halt to dam construction. The Secretaria de Gobernaci6n ordered a halt to construction of new dams on the Nazas. The hacendados, however,
were not to be denied. Ignoring the suspension order, they continued construction of the new dam, which was completed in
1889. The question of who controlled the water rights to the
Nazas was so important to the economy of the Laguna that the
state of Durango and neighboring Coahuila became embroiled in
a legal battle over the issue which dragged through the Federal
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courts for years until Diaz nationalized the waters of Mexico
in 1888. 25
The states of Durango and Coahuila clashed over water rights
on numerous other occasions. Neither party was pleased by the
increased damming of the Nazas by the Durangueno hacendados,
and a rift within the ruling elite ensued. The principal losers were
the pueblos of the Laguna whose efforts to obtain a just settlement of the water question proved futile. Finally, the struggle of
the pueblos provided the vecinos with a bitter education in the
inefficacy of peaceful protest. Its failure undoubtedly served to
radicalize the orientation of their future efforts.
The creation of a rural proletariat proved crucial during the
Revolution, and was another source of tension within Durangueno society. Although some of the rural working class were
employed in industry and mining, the majority were agricultural
laborers. Wages in the mining industry were the highest in the
state, even though in the Durango mines they were slightly
below the national average. They were generally lower in the
cotton textile industry than in the mines. In other industries they
sank even lower. The lowest wages in the state were paid to agricultural laborers. Low pay was responsible in part for the creation
of a highly mobile work force, for many workers took to the road
in search of better employment. 26 When the time came, a good
many of these displaced peasants joined the rebel armies.
Increased tension between the rural work force and their employers was sparked by three factors: low wages; the dominance
of Americans in the mining industry; and the tienda de raya of
the mining industry. Moreover, in the mines an American machinist received from five to ten pesos per day while his Mexican
counterpart was paid only one to three pesos for equal work,27
The development of an embryonic labor movement had begun
in 1882 with the formation of the Sociedad de Obreros Cat6licos
in Ciudad Durango. Although little is known about this organization, there is some evidence indicating that the union was involved in a strike against the Cerro del Mercado mine in 1884..
Two major strikes in 1907 involved local workers in the strike
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demands of the nation's railroad and textile workers. It is hard
to assess the role of local workers in these strikes, but the fact that
they did participate would suggest that they were cognizant of
the nationwide labor movement. The most important local strike
occurred on April 7, 1909, at the Velardefia mines. A large spontaneous demonstration by the workers to protest low wages and
the influence of Americans in the mines was violently suppressed
by Federal troops at the command of Governor Fernandez. This
nascent union movement could have provided the workers with
invaluable organizational experiences. Probably the repressive
fashion in which the local government dealt with the challenge
served to further politicize the workers. 28
A strong anti-American sentiment among the mine workers was
demonstrably growing during the fading years of the Porfiriato.
As an aftermath of the 1890's silver boom the number of Americans in Durango greatly increased. Clashes were inevitable when
the peasants who were pushed off the land found their way into
the mines. Throughout the 1890'S and the first decade of the
twentieth century, American consular officials in Durango continued to report more anti-Americanism and clashes between
American and Mexican workers within the state. The Velardefia
mines were often singled out by American officials as the strongest source of anti-Americanism. It is little wonder, then, that when
the Revolution erupted, the mines quickly became a frequent
target of the rebel bands.
Curiously, the workers' anti-American sentiment appears to
have been shared by local jefes politicos who resented the favoritism shown to American-owned mines and haciendas by the
State's governors. Time and again, the governors overrode the
decisions of the local authorities. In one notable incident, Governor Fernandez impeached a member of the State supreme court,
who was accused of attacking an American miner. There is also
evidence of anti-American sentiment in the local press. In 1897,
La Evoluci6n bitterly denounced the United States for refusing
to return an American citizen, who was sought in connection
with the murder of a Mexican national, to Durango. It is hardly
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surprising that less than three months after the outbreak of the
Revolution, the U. S. consul reported that between fifty and
seventy-five per cent of Durango's population was anti-American. 29
The continued domination and intransigence of Durango's
inflexible political elite greatly intensified the mounting social
conflict. At the beginning of the Porfiriato, the state was plagued
by political instability. General Juan Manuel Flores was the first
Diaz governor to survive a full term in office, but in 188o Diaz
changed his mind and replaced Flores with a civilian, Francisco
G6mez del Palacio. Within two years, Diaz, apparently disenchanted with Gomez del Palacio's performance, quietly began
urging Flores to attack the efficiency of the G6mez del Palacio
administration. Shortly afterwards Gomez del Palacio died, throwing the state into political confusion. The question of succession
was resolved in 1884 when Diaz once again placed the goyernorship in the hands of Flores. With the assumption of power by
Flores, the full impact of the Porfiriato reached Durango. 30
Flores was reelected four times, making him one of the longest
ruling of the Diaz governors. During his administration, Durango
began to make economic progress, partly as a result of the tranquil
political climate he managed to establish. His death in 1897 produced a temporary resurgence of political instability when Diaz
once more had difficulty in selecting a successor. Between 1897
and 1904 a number of governors came and went. Finally, in 1904,
Diaz decided upon Esteban Fernandez, who remained in power
until mid- 19 11. 31
The principal preoccupation of the Diaz governors was the protection of foreign mining interests, primarily North American,
and those of the commercial haciendas. According to American
consular officials, the governors were quite willing to cooperate
with American interests and in general displayed an extremely hospitable attitude. Furthermore, both Governors Flores and Fernandez were closely linkc:d to mining and commercial agricultural
interests. Besides protecting these economic interest groups, the
governors were constantly promoting the development of transportation facilities, which mainly benefited the state's economic
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elites. 32 One instance of the governor's favoritism toward the haciendas took plac;e in 190 I. In that year, Governor Fernandez
came to the aid of the Hacienda de Sombretillos, near Cuencame,
in its efforts to obtain the land of nearby Indian pueblos. Ignoring
the fact that the pueblos held legal titles to their lands dating back
to the colonial era, Fernandez appointed an arbiter in the case,
who, as one might expect, ruled in favor of the Hacienda de Sombretillos. 33 As the tension in the Laguna mounted during the waning years of the Porhriato, State officials sought to maximize their
control over the rural populace. In 19°5 General Bernardo Reyes
recommended to Governor Fernandez that troops be permanently
stationed in the Laguna in order to reduce the possibility of
an armed uprising, a suggestion which Fernandez prudently
followed. 34
Organized political opposition to the Diaz regime in Durango
centered in Ciudad Durango among the city's professional classes.
A local chapter of the Liberal Party was organized in 19°°. Almost
immediately after the ill-fated Liberal Party Congress of 190 I, the
Durango chapter was suppressed during a nationwide crackdown
on political opposition groups. Yet, it is evident that the Liberal
Party did have some influence in stimulating political consciousness. In his study of the Liberal Party, James Cockcroft lists a
number of Laguna revolutionaries, who, he contends, were affiliated with the Liberal Party, the most prominent being Calixto
Contreras. 35
Another opposition party which protested against the government was the Partido Democratico de Mexico. The party was
supported primarily by middle-income groups, as was the local
chapter of the Anti-reelectionist Party, founded by Pastor Rouaix.
In connection with his 191o presidential campaign, Francisco
Madero made two whistle-stop tours through the state, bringing
with him a spirit of hope for this new generation of anti-Diaz
political activists. In addition to political opposition in Ciudad
Durango, there was much similar activity in T orre6n, which,
because of its proximity to the Laguna, was bound to influence
the region. The fact that the Lerdo-Gomez Palacio-Torreon axis
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witnessed the first onslaught of the Revolution suggests that prerevolutionary political dissent was an important catalyst in educating and radicalizing potential revolutionaries. 36
Perhaps the most common form of opposition in Durango was
the long-standing tradition of banditry. Over the years the state
produced a number of notable bandits, the most nationally famous
being Pancho Villa, who was born on an hacienda in the heart of
the Laguna, and Tomas Urbina, who later became one of Villa's
most trusted generals. The most famous local bandit was Heraclio
Bernal, who operated in the state for more than twelve years until
his death at the hands of the rurales in 1888. The government had
placed a price of ten thousand pesos on his head, a reflection of his
importance. In an editorial about the government campaign against
him, La Bandera Raja commented:
Terror. We know that it is expanding among the inhabitants of the
Sierra as the government troops march against BernaL We have
heard speak of many executions, of many victims of cruelties which
we know cause horror ... We agree that it is necessary to capture
Bernal, but the sentiments of humanity rebel when one considers
the number of innocent victims ...37

Many American miners recalled that the mines were a frequent target for the state's numerous outlaw bands.s8 These diverse
and dissimilar forms of political opposition lead one to surmise
that a fairly long-standing and well-entrenched predisposition to
oppose the government existed, particularly among the lower
classes, and it was readily transformed into revolutionary activity.
The Maderist phase of the Mexican Revolution in Durango
commenced on November 20, 1910, when a small band of rebels
attacked GOmez Palacio. Momentarily successful, the rebels were
soon driven out by Federal troops.
As the fatal days of 1910 drew to a close, Durango's social
system was near collapse. The state was dominated by an intransi~
gent political elite, whose sole purpose seems to have been to serye
Diaz and the state's mining and commercial agricultural interests.
This resulted in the birth of a political opposition movement among
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the workers and the peasants. The economic slump in the mining
industry provoked a downward trend in the Durangueno economy
resulting in rising unemployment and increasing worker discontent. The introduction of commercial agriculture in the Laguna
and the concomitant escalation of land encroachment by the
hacendados seriously weakened the traditional social order, kindling a strong desire for agrarian reform among the peasants. Indeed, land reform became the rallying cry for the Revolution.
Small groups of armed men began to consolidate in the countryside. The strain which modernization had placed upon rapidly
deteriorating social conditions was bound to open up Pandora's
box, and in early February 191 I the Revolution re-erupted simultaneously in several areas of the state.
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